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DIVIDED TERRITORIES AND THE 
ORIGIN OF THE COLD W AR IN ASIA * 
Eiichi Shindo 
Despite the fact that th巴primarypoint of friction in Japanese postwar 
diplomacy remains the unceasing problem of territorial disputes， this issue 
has yet to r世間iveadequate consideration from the field of Cold War re-
search. Scholars have made much of Soviet proposals of 1945 such as the 
division of Japan into four parts or the two part division of Hokkaido， 
and， removed from their original context， have regarded them as proof of 
Soviet “expansionism". Why is it that territory considerations contnue to 
be the Achilles' heel of postwar Japanese diplomacy? Even without con-
sidering the islands of Takeshima and Senkaku， why was Okinawa di苧
vested frOIl Japan， and why are the Southern Kuriles stil divided? De. 
spite the developlllent of Cold War historical reserarch in recent years， its 
approach to this fundalllental problelll of Japanese foreign affairs relllains 
unjustifiably abstruse. The territorial dispute has previously been isolated 
froll the forlllation process of Japan's peace treaty and viewed as a sepa 
rate dilllension of the origin of the Cold War in Asia(l). Doesn 'tthe origin 
of this Ilyth lie in an attelllpt to justify the conservative's approach to 
postwar diplolllacy? This myth revolves around the belief that the Com-
munist countries sought to harden the Cold War by altering the status 
quo， thus making the separate peace and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security 
Treaty (hereafter referred to as Ampo) seem an inevitable product of fate. 
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* 1 express my deepest thanks to Prof. Richard Minear of Univ. of Mass. at 
Amherst and Dr. Scott Young， then a graduate student at Tsukuba Univ.， who 
translated into English my Japanese draft， whose original version was printed in 
SEKAI， Apr. 1979. 
This myth is nothing more than an ilJusion created by an unrealistic 
assessment of the diplomatic provisions that should have led to worJd 
peace and neutrality(幻.
Usil1符【locumcntsrecently made available to the public， and my own 
research compiled from a series of interviews. 1 will trace the groping 
evollltion of policy among the United States， Japan， and the Soviet Union 
as concerns J apan's territorial dispute， demonstrating the falseness of this 
myth which has been taken as the basis for Japan's rearmament. Research 
has r日vealとdthat sinc己beforethe end of the war， Soviet fears and anxiety 
were rooted in Amcrican anti.‘status quo bむhavior、followingwhich both 
the U.S. and Japan opted for司日巴parat巴peacelong before the 1947 phase 
was reached whereby Ampo supposedly bεcame inevitable. Also， the hard. 
liners in both Japan and the United States were preoccllpied with cir. 
cumstance日thatmade a separatc p巴acethe only option despite the exist 
ence ()f cooperation by som巴Sovietpolicy towarcl the United States and 
the conciliatory日tancetaken by softliner日withinthe U.S. Department of 
State toward the Soviets‘It also appears that the Japanese leaders in con. 
trol of the newly reor詰anized.establishment formecl th巴 harclJineanti崎
Soviet faction which，ゼntanglingtcrritoriaJ concεrns with other require 
ments. opposecl the initiativ巴()fthe Soviet softliners in obtainin耳a“gener.
al peace". My res日archinto thc origin of the territorial clispute and 
rearmament will show the prototype of Japanese.American postwar rela. 
tions as well as the pitfalls of recent diplomatic disagreements which have 
agam ral日ed.a clamor ov('r the threat from the llorth. 
This paper's fOCllS will be concentrated on the unfolcling of American 
policy. This is done in order to ensure adherance to historicaJ fact and 
avoicl any unwarranted speclllation without the historiccal documents 
1. The State Department's Initiative: Wartime Planning 
Consider昌tionsregarcling Japanese territory were being formulated 
within the U.S. State Department as early as 1942， only one y巴arafter the 
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attack on Pearl Harbor. 
These postwar policy preparation日werebeing developecl by the East 
Asian Group of the Special Studies Division of the State Department. Af-
ter January of 1944. the East Asian Group's de facto successor， the Far 
Eastern Ar巴aCommittee， continued these delil】日rations.This group was 
composed of Far Eastern specialists who were guided by the ideals of the 
Atlantic Charter and dedicated to the principle of opposition to territorial 
annexations which required the divestiture of any territory aquired 
through military force. These ideals were reaffirmed by the United States， 
Great Britain， China and the Soviet Union at the Cairo meeting in Novem-
ber of 1943_ These principl日swere subsequently embodied in the Pots-
dam Declaration communicated to Japan immediately before the end of the 
war. Japan eventually accepted this document which included. as one of 
the surrender conditions， Article XIII: “The Japanese Sovereignty shall 
be limited to the islands of Honshu， Hokkaido， Kyushu， Shikoku， and such 
minor islands as we determine...". 
D己spitethεgeneral principles of opposition to territorial annexations， 
actual pJans were being drawn up in the State Department to determine 
exactly what was meant by the phrase “minor islands" in the Potsdam De 
c1aration. ln this process， the most heated debate concerned the disposi-
tion of the Ryukyu and Kurile archipelagoes and the Southern Pacific Is-
lands， principally the League of Nation's Mandated Islands， including the 
Bonins (Ogasawara) and the Izu IsIands. Compounding the problem was 
the urging of the American military to place the Ryukyus and the South-
ern Pacific Islands under American jurisdiction， on one hand， while it was 
anticipated that China and the Soviet Union would press their claims on， 
respectively， the Ryukyus and the Kuriles. 
As the meeting between the United States， Great Britain， and the 
Soviet Union approached， the State Department， from November of 1944 
through January of the folIowing year and indeed， up until the night be-
fore the Yalta conference， had come to the folIowing conclusions about the _ 
postwar disposition of the two archipelagoes. The Kurile from Etorofu 七
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south were considered on historical and geographical grounds to be ハ
Japanese territory_ The middle and northern Kuriles， which Japan had re- 一
ceived in 1875 from Russia in exchange for Southern Sakhalin， were con-
sidered to be Russian， and consideration was given to placing them， 
should the Soviet Union agree， under U.N. trusteeship. MOI-eover， special 
attention was paid to Japanεse fishing rights in the northern Kuriles. The 
Southern Pacific Islands， including the Bonins， were to be placed uncler 
U.N. trusteeship since there was no objection to the establishrnent of U.N. 
military bases there. By al accounts the Ryukyus were Japanese territory， 
but in case China should urge strongly their reversion to China， or in case 
the resiclents strongly desired a transfer of soverei四tyfrom Japan， there 
shoulcl be created an international committee to which t.he final decision 
wOlllcl be entrllstcd. 1'0 be surc， inthis case as well， nothing preventecl the 
establishment of U‘N. bases th巴rel)
ln the proce日sof discussion， the Bonins got lumped together with the 
old rnandatecl territories as territories llncler American trusteeship守 ancl
the committ巴econsidered the possibility of placing military b創刊sin the 
I~yukyus. 1'hese d引'clopmentstook place because of the bitter fi耳htin只
with militarist Japan in the Pacific， which led the Americans to appreciat日
th巴militaryvalue of thes日islanclsin terms of guaranteeing AlIied security 
against Japan. In this case too， the bases were for thc sake not of the 
American military but of th日lnternationalPolice Force envisioned at that 
time. Parenth巴ticallyit is worth noting that the committee considcred the 
strategic value of th巴Ryukyusfar inferior to that of Taiwan. 
1n any case， these were considered territories which should revert to 
a clefeated Japan. not territories Jap呂nhacl gained by conquest; the princi-
ple prevailecl that there should be no annexations ancl that ]apan shoulcl 
be restricted to her “proper territoryへThcrewas no thought given at 
that time to the value of the islands as strategic bases against the Sovict 
Union. 
n. F.D.R.'s Intervention: The Yalta Agreements 
七 These plans for the postwar disposition of Japanes在住rntorywere re-
杢 viewed by two 0伽 comrn附 eswithin the St脱 D伽f叩p仰制rtm附ε叩n此t仁:first t凶heむけ1n凶t 
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Japan， and then， since prewar Japanese territory included dependent areas， 
the Depenclent Area Committee. These cornmitte'es largely confirmed the 
policy clescribed above 
The existence of secret Yalta agreements concerning the Kuriles， 
macle public in February 1946， constitutecl something of a shock. This， 
followecl by th日divelopmentof品Soviet←Americanconfrontation in Europe， 
began the American military's vigorous insistence on annexation， not re 
version， of the Southern Pacific lslancls and th巴 Ryukyusor， failing 
annexation， at least possible use of these islands as military bas巳s.
The secret agreements exchanged between F.D.R. and Stalin in Febl・u.
ary 1945 at Yalta contained the promise to “hand over" the Kuriles. 
This included th巴SouthernKuriles which had previously been counted as 
.lapan巳seterritory. This secret agreement exchangcd with th巳SovietUnion 
can hardly be said to reflect the postwar policy towarcl Japan developecl 
by the Far East巴rnspecialists within the State Department. Specifically， 
subtle discrepancies in policy exist巴din counting the Southern Kuriles as 
Japanese territory whereas Yalta had promised to hand over al the 
Kurile日tothe Soviet Union 
?????
ln order to obscllre the difference between pre日existingState Depart. 
ment policy and Yalta on the disposition of the Kuriles， a number of re. 
medies were suggested. The most realistic solution available was to rede. 
fine the terms of Yalta by dividing the Southern Kuriles and then stipulat 
ing exactly which islands were to be considered Japanese territory・lnthe 
end， rather th品nargue that the Yalt呂 agre巳mentsrequired substantial re. 
vision， the State Department chose instead to respect the policy of coop. 
eration with the Soviet Union(4) Feeling that even secret international 
agreements should be respected， the State Department c巴asedmaking an 
issue of the redefining of the Kuriles， and when the Soviet Union agrced 
that the Southern Kuriles， c1efined in the most rcstrictecl sense meant that 
the island of Shikotan ancl south should r巴vertto Japan， the Stat日Dcpart.
ment dropped its opposition(5)ーAsa final note， itcan be said that realiza 
tion of the State Department's territorial settlement plan for Japan de. 
pencled on the coexistence of both a gcneral principle prohibiting territo. 
rial expansion and a general policy ()f cooperation with the Soviet Union 
As far as the Southern Pacific Is1ands were concerned， the State De. 
partment rej巴ctedthe military's opinion that， except for the lzu Chain， al 
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ノ、
islands. including the Marcus. Bonin， and the Volcanic !slands， be placed 
under the“日xclu日ives()verei~nty" of the United States. It did so on tht， 
grounds that thi，; proposal contravened thぐ poiicyof nり ann巴xations.The 
State Deparmcnt hejd tenaciously to the position that these islands. de 
fined as“territories not yet ready for political self-gov巳rnment，.."were 
to be placed under U.N. trustceship with the United Statcs a日“社dminister
ing authority " To be sure， the question of whばherthe Southern Pacific 
Island古 should be desi符nat仔d"strat巳gicarむ白日 inwhich military bases 
coulcl bc est.ablished woulcl havc to await agrecment with the military句 but
the emphasis at that timc was on [('当trictin記“strategicareas吟 asmuch as 
possiblc. 
As for the Ryukyus， lhe military held that al the islancl日号outhof the 
30th parallel inclllding Okinawa， should be placed under American juris-
dictioll， and that al t!1l、 veryleast plマmanentAmericall basps should be 
established on some of them， particularly Okinawa. The State Department 
rejected this position n、commθndinginstead th品tthe Ryukyus句 asa Ul1lt， 
“...shoulcl bぞ conclidcredterritories to be returned to Japan..." relyIn再 011
the argument that the retention of the l~yukyus by the Unitec! States 
woulcl fly in tJH、faceof earlier assertions that the U nited States opposed 
“territoriaJ expansion". Moreover守 toturn Okinawa into a permanent miliι 
ary base would constitute an overt thrでatto China ancl particularly the 
Soviet Union. 
The establishment by the United States of a permanent base In 
Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryulyu Islands would be likeJy to 
provoke serious international repercussions.・…Theexistence of 
such a base， in addition to the other Paeific bases to be held by 
the United States and in such a proximity to thεChina coast， 
might come to be regarded by thc Soviet lInion as a provocative 
threat rather than as a proper defensive move by the United 
States (I_ 
In this case the logic of the doctrine of international eooperation was 
cJosely linkecl to the principle of nonexpansiol1. Moreovel・， the postwar 
ドirst泳、仁retaryof State， Jamcs Byrnes， hacl applied this 10詰icto his own 
political phi!osophy， ancl l10t confinin耳 himselfto the propo日alsof only 
micldl<' cschelon officials、l1Sl'dthis logic to form the basis of thc State De-
partment's own tcrritorial settlement policy toward Japan. Gerogc H 
Blakeslee， the central figure among the State Department's Far Eastern 
specialists， patterned himsむIfaft巴rthe、ide品listicinternationalisrn of PresI-
dent W泣きon.This， cornbined with the fact that Byrnes and former Secret 
ary of State Hull envisioned thc possibility ()f a seconcl Wilson ancl recall. 
l1耳 thatf<oosevelt hacl actually scrvecl as Unersceretary of the Navy in 
the Wilson 寄りnernment，demonstrated the influence of Wilsonian logic 
within thc State Departmene') 
11. The Draft Peace of March， 1947 and the Soviet Union's 
Response 
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The yiews of these East Asian experts within the State I)('partrnent 
carriecl over Into the draft which was clrawn lIP by the committee for a 
lapan巴sePeace Treaty in the Office of Far East巴rnAffairs in October 
1946， one year after the tc、rminationof hostilities(HI. This was only natu-
ral， for the chairman of that comrnittee was Hugh Borton， then Acting 
Chief of the lapanese Division， who had been Blakeslee's right-hand man 
throughout the wartime planning for postwar Japan. Four member邑ofthe 
existing committee inheritecl by Borton also provided support for the poli-
cies clealing with the peace initiative toward Japan. The oth日rsupporters 
includecl John K. Ernrnerson， who had organized an anti.war rnoy巴ment
among exile、dJapanese Communists in Yenan during the war and following 
the war had taken part in the determination of territorial issues as a mem. 
bcr of the Inter.Divisional Cornrnittee， as well as Edwin K. Martin who 
participated in Roos巴velt's economic reform l10vernent and Warren S 
HlInsberger， an East Aisan econornist with strong internationalist leanings 
Also includecl was Ruth Bacon， an international lawyer who had worked 
previously with the League of Nations. Moreover、thepolicy was rein-
forced by 10hn Carter Vincent， head of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs， 
who wa日rll10redto be in line for th巴fir日tAmbassaclorship to China af. 
ter the restoration of diplomatic relations had he not been forccd out of 
thc State Deparment during the McCarthy era(9) 
The disposition of territories was the first itcm to be agreed upon in 
the draft peace treaty of March 1947. In Chapter 1， the territories over 
which Japan must renounce sovereignty and those over which ]apan 
should remain sovereign wcr巴stipulatedin nine articles. The only change 
from previous State Department policy concerned ]apanese sov日reigntyin 
the Kuril日swhich stated that ]apanese territory did not end at Shikotan， 
but included the two islands Kunashiri and Etorofu as well. This mocl 
ification in the c1efinition of the“Southern Kuriles" rested on the so-callecl 
“1875 concept" and wa日 litlemore than a return to the State Depart. 
ment's wartime planning for ]apan to which we have already referred(lO) 
Early in March 1947， having completed the draft that included thc 
chapter which focllsed on territorial issucs， Borton went to Tokyo with 
legal counselor Ruth Bacon to sound out MacArthuf and U.S， political 
advisor to SCAP， Georg巴 Atcheson_When their opinion hacl been taken 
into account， the punilive flavor of the original draft was c1iluted. Then，in 
the first part of ]uly， according to established procedure， the calI went out 
to the eleven governments which constituted the Far Eastern Commission 
for the opening of a ]apanese Peace conference， and in early August the 
completed s巴cond-stagedraft was sent to Secretary and Unclersecretary of 
State. In ]anuary of 1947， secretary of Stat巴 Byrneswas replacecl by 
General Marshall， form巴rSecr巴taryof the Army， while the Unclersecret. 
ary of State position was fi1led by Lovett who was the former Unersecret 
ary of the Army. It was proposed by the Officc of Far Eastcrn Affairs 
that the peace conference shoulcl opcn in Washington in late August or 
carly September 
This summons， however， mct with strong resistance from the Soviet 
Union and China‘Chin巴seresistance， aimecl at extracting American aicl to 
China and at strengthening the Chinese voice in the matter of reparations 
from ]apan has led to the assumption that， for the Chinese， the real issue 
was presumably bargaining power. By contrast， thc Soviet resistance w注目
morc substantiaL If the ]apanese peace treaty was submittecl to th巴巴leven
nation conferenc巴asopposecl to a Four rower consisting of the U.s， U.K.， 
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USS.R.， and Chin礼t:heSoviet Union would havc no vcto power and fear・
rose that it would b巴 forcα1to swallow the American dr荘[t.Hence the 
Soviet Union was most concerned about the possibility that at slIch a eon-
ference th台 promisesof Yalta concerning Southcrn Sakhalin and the 
Kuriles would be broken. 
1n a July 22nc! aide-memoire to Secretary Marshal!， Semen K. Tsarap 
kin. representative to the Far E呂sternCommission， alluded to the agr巴仔
ments of Cairo， Yalta， and Potsdam， continuing to stress the maintenancむ
of 1.hεwartime agreements as a point of discussion specifically for the fo-
ur-power Forei宮nMinisters Conference(ll} This allusion outlines the sub 




Following the surrender of ]apan， the Soviet Union took every oppor-
tunity to remmd the Americ乱nsof the Yalta agreements， succeeding at 
least in part in obtainin耳aninformal commitment fro!l the United States 
to abide by those secret agreements. On August 18， 1945， immediately af-
ter the J:nd of the war， Stalin requested that the KuriJes bc placed uncler 
thc jurisdiction of Sovi巴toccupation authorities in accordance with the cle-
cisions made by the Big Three at Yalta; Truman answered that he was in 
complete agreement with the above proceedings(l2). Secretary of State 
Byrnes， at a press conference in early September， made clear the intention 
of the l.T nited StatE、sto abide by the Yalta agreem巴nts(U}In Decem ber of 
that year， at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers， Byrnes re 
sponding to Molotov's inquiry， reiterated that the United States intended 
to abide by the Yalta promises concerning Sakhalin and theKuriles(l ，1). 
Byrnes， however， u日edboth meetings as opportunities to suggest that 
the final legal recognition of territoriaJ changes would have to wait for the 
conc.!usion of a peace treaty with Japan， possibly compromising the valid-
ity of the Yalta agreements by reserving j udgment on certain provisions. 
For this vεry reason， when a peace treaty with Japan became the order of 
the day， itwas impossible for the Soviet Union not to pay cxtraordinary 
attention to the promises concerning the northern t巴rritories
The intention of the Soviet Union regarding the clisposition of the 
northern territories was to gain an American commitement to abide by the 
Yalta agreements 
ドirstly.by extracting a commitment from the United States to abide 
by the Yalta agreements. the Soviet Union would be able to make its as 
yet legally unsettled sovereignty over Southern Karafuto and the Kuriles 
legitimate and concIusive. Due to the fart that the Soviet Union possessed 
sufficient historical grounds for their claim to both Karafuto and Kuriles 
(excluding the Southern Kl1riles). and throl1gh a desire ()f the Soviet gov-
ernm巳ntto satisfy the demands of the Sovi日tpeople who suffered the loss 
of twenty miIIion of their fellows during the war， the Soviets sOl1ght legal 
confirmation over these same islands which would function as strategic 
military bas巴sagainst Japan. thereby insuring the futrl1e security of the 
Soviet Union. 
Secondly， the Soviet demand of western compliance with thεYalta 
provisions served the function of incr巴asingSoviet bargaining power in 
negotiating a peace settlemenl with J apan. The referenc巴to“theKuriles" 
promis日dto the Soviet Union in the Yalta agreement， include the Southern 
Kl1riles to which the Soviets possessed no truly legitimate cJaim and， from 
th(、Sovietstandpoint， were of only limited strategic value. In this way thぞ
Southern Kuriles would serve as a bargaining chip in the negotiations 
allowing the Soviets to secure a more favorablεpeace settlement. 1t was 
not clear then whether the Soviets intended to include the two islands of 
Etorofu and K l1nashiri among the Southern Kuriles or limit them to the is-
lands ()f Habomai and Shikotan. ln the strictest sense though， the fact re-
mains that the Soviets intended to return this territory as it was obvious 
ly of litle strategic value since th(γelect巴dat that tille not to establish 
military bases on these islands(15) Furthermore， at the Japall-Soviet Joint 
Declaration in 1956， the Soviet again reiteratecl their intention to restore 
these islands to Japan. 
lf thεSoviet Union had no intention to annex these islands for milit-
_ ary purposes. what then did they seek to obtain from a peace settlement 
六 withJapan? lt was a peaee that would guarant町 Sovietsecurity in the 
jL Far East. We could conclude that following the revolutIon at the end of 
the First W orld War， the existence of th巴 SovsietUnion had been o 
threatened through military intervention by four powers: ]apan， Great Bri-
tain， France， and the United Statesぜ Atthat time ]apan had sent over 
120，000 soldiers into Siberia， occuping a vast region stretching from 
Northern Karafuto to the shore of Lake Baikal. These “lessons of the past" 
created an indelible impression upon the Soviets and heightened their de. 
termination to guarantee their security in the Far East following the con句
clusion of World War IL 
The Soviet Union made the peace with Japan contingent on the follow. 
ing demands: prevention of resurgence of Japanese militarism， complete 
democratization of Japan， establishment of an international control system 
on Japanese military industries， and the freezing at its current level of the 
American military encirclement of the Soviet Union or a reduction in the 
number of American bases in the Pacific(16). 
The Soviet Union's anxiety over the expansion of American bases in 
the postwar Pacific was made cl巴arjust before the end of the war， inMay 
1945， at the San Francisco Conference to draft the Charter of the United 
Nations. At this time the Soviet Union， realizing that the United States 
planned to establish bases in th巴 SouthernPacific Islands， opposed the 
United states， asserting that the Southern Pacific Islands should be 
granted the status of independent nations in accordance with the principle 
of national sεlf.determination(17). In addition. the Soviet Union insisted 
that the designation of these as strategic areas with military bases under 
U.N. trusteeship could only be done by th巴U.N.Secllrity Coucil， inwhich， 
of COllrse， the Great Power's veto was valied， and sought to frllstrate the 
misuse by the United States of the trusteeship system(18). This Soviet de. 
mand materialized as Article 83 of the U.N. Charter‘ 
Despite Soviet anxiety， the United States government. particlIlarly the 
Army， tried not simply to turn the old mandated territories in the South. 
ern Pacific into trust territories， blt planned to annex them in order to 
decrease the financial and political costs accompanied with trusteeship， 
and to巴xtendits belt of bases from. the Southern Pacific Islands north to 
the islands sOllth of Japan and west as far as the RYllkYlls. With the en. 六
ding of the war， this intention on the part of the military to sever these is. 
lands from Japan and place them lInder direct military jurisdiction showed 
signs of being put into efect(19). 
To be sure. the State Department， as we have seen opposed the milit. 
J¥ 
aryおpo日itiol，and by cりmpro司lIscbctwecn the two sides， thc following dc 
eision was reached in December 1946: the status of the Ryukyus would 
be lef( to future decisioll礼ndthat thf'日outhcrt1Pacific lslands bむ placcd
undcr the stratp!日ictrustceship with the Unitecl Stat昨日呂sadministering au-
thority. Thi日wasrecognizピd品目 theState-War-Navy Coordinating Commitマ
tce dcc.isiol1 ;)9/9 ofド己bruary1947. T、heU日itcdStates. foliowing the 
proecdun'のfArticle 8:)のfthe (LN. Charter. requested that the United Na-
tions Security Council recognize th.is disposition. ln early April whilE、Bor
ton waメ inT、okyoparticipating in the drafting of the peace treaty with 
j且pan.the Security Counc、ilunanimously approv日dthe American trustee一
日hipof the Southern Pac:ific fslands. The Soviet (Inion approved thi百 r。
solution callin符 onlyfor an amendment that日tipulatedthis region in the 
future should“...prepare to advance toward inclependcncc，(2U) As far as 
thc Sovict日 WCiCconcerned， these Southern Pacific islands could function 
as bascs from which attacks could be launched against Japan and mi日ht
al日o.st sorne tln杷 inthe fllture， serve a品目trategicmilitary bases for 
attacks ag立instthe Sovid Union: thisφhowevpr. wa日viewedas a relatively 
minor threaL Agrc・ementwith thc U.s on this point may have been de 
別立neclto scnd a mcssage to the Ameri仁社n耳目ignalingthe existance of a 
Soviet policy ofεooperation or compromise intcnded to forestall an even 
greater threaL 
That even greatcr threat was the cxpansion of the circle of _l¥merican 
military installations in the Western Pacific. The Soviet leaders grew in-
creasingly anxio¥ls at the prospect of turnin記 Okinawainto a permanent 
military base. By usin月 Okinawaas a sta耳III宮 area.the United States 
would be capable of呂 directassault on Soviet territory. Futhermore， the 
United States wa日 inexclusive possession of the most terrible weapon 
known to mankind. the atomic bomb. Unquestionably what the Soviet Un-
ion fearecl most from the peace settlement with Japan was not only the 
プ'¥ reemergence of Japanese miHtarism， but also a scenario in which the 
七 SovietcJaim to Southern I<arafuto and the K uriles was denied， the location 
.- of American bases on Okinawa as well as on the Southern P呂cifieislands 
and japan becoming a link in an anti-Soviet strategy(21). 
Faccd with these Soviet anxieties and d巴mands，the United States in 
early August 1947 had at least two options to choos巴between.The first 
possibility巴ntailcdycilding in a partial response to Soviet dClllands and a 
Japanesc peacc settlelllcnt formed on the basis of coopcration with the 
Sov.iet llnion. The sccond option involved ignoring Sovict opposition while 
opting for a scparate peacc with Japan. 1n other words， the choicc was b巴一
twecn a general peacc and且separatcpeacじゅ
Thc concept of a general peace was support吋 byAssistant Secretary 
of State John H. Hilldring， Assistant Secret且ryof State for Occupied 
Areas， foremost Russian expert and Yalta advisor Charles E. Bohlcn， State 
Department legal advisor Charles Fahy， and Robert A. Feary of the Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs 
Illlmcdiately after the draft peacc plan for Japan was transmitted to 
S巴cretaryMarshall by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs， Hilldring recom. 
mended that Marshal1 endorse the Soviet proposal to entrust the peace 
negotiations to th日 Councilof Foreign Ministers(22l. Bohlen appeal巴dto 
Marshall that， whethじrestablished procedure was followed and the Far 
Eastern Council entrusted with the deliberation or not， the United States 
should communicate the Soviet Union thεfact that there was no change in 
lt昌 intention lo respect the Yalta agr白日ments(2:l)Fahy urged Lovett that 
the United States should honor Yalta even though a difference of opinion 
existed over the definition of the two southern Kurile islands， Etorofu and 
Kunashiri(21Jー
Hilldring， in charg日 ofGermany and Korea. personally felt that the 
Soviet side would respond (juickly to an American cooperationist policy 
while Bohlen， despite his sympathy with th日containmentpolicy of his col. 
league K巴nnan，thoroughly understood from previous experience as 
Roosev{悦'sadvisor on Soviet affairs that continuation of the wartime poli. 
cy of cooperating with the Soviets was the key to postwar stabilization(2S)ー
Thc reason Fahy joined Hilldring and Bohlell in urging the cooperationist _ 
approach to the Soviet Union may have been that a few months before， in -;日
..J.勾
the U.N. Security Council meeting of F'ebruary 1947， the Soviet Union，ハ
discarding its earlier opposition and no using its veto， had supported the ー占
American proposal to place the Southern Pacific Islands under strategic 
trusteeship with the U.S. as administrator; as legal advisor he witnessed 
that event and saw therein th昌tthe Soviet Union's Asia policy contained 
room for cooreration with the United States. 
Feary would later echo his concern to other cooperationists 80rton 
and Maxwell Hamilton， State Department Special Advisor for the Japanese 
peace settlement， over the formula for a peace conferenc巴inwhich the Un-
ited States had no veto power. It was apparent to Feary that even if the 
United States succeeded in gaining a two-thirds majority on issues such as 
Japan's巴conomicr巴coveryand war reparation， the U.S. negotiators would 
stil be required to make repeated efforts to obtain the agreement of the 
individual nations and the consent of the Far Eastern Commission. Howev-
er the U司S.desire“to realize military bas巴son the Ryukyus could be 
achi巴vedonly over the categorical opposition of the Soviets and possibly 
the Chinese， regardless of how they were approached." Even if the peace 
treaty would be concluded over Soviet opposition， the Soviet could reject 
at any time the ratification of such a treaty. In addition Feary emphasized 
that the Soviet Union led， over al others， in demanding internal reforms 
in Japan. He also questioned the efficacy of a peace settled by denying the 
Sovjet Union veto power， and wondered whether or not ignoring Soviet 
opposition would be worth the price (26). Feary， the co-author of the draft 
resolution for land reform with Radezinski， believed that the realization of 
inernal reform was probably the most significant area in the development 
of policy for Japan(27). 
Secterary Marshall and Undersecretary Lovett， however， chose not to 
take the option of a general peace which was based on c∞peration with 
the Soviet Union. They， as representatives of the military， overestimated 
the Soviet threat， and desiring the enlargement of the belt of military 
bases for use against the Soviets， rejected the option of a general peace 
which would include their “supposed"巴nemy，the Soviet Union. 
80th Marshall and Lovett were influenced by the ideas of another 
六 Russianexpert Geroge F. Kennan， head of the Policy Planning Staff for 
五 the State Department， and believing that his theories were largely correct， 
四 drewheavily on Kennan's logic in formulating department policy. Actually 
they received the Japanese peace treaty draft from the Office of Far East-
ern Affairs and with advice from 80hlen asked for Kennan's opinions on 
tlw mattcr. The Po!icy Planning Staff was then requested by Marshall and 
Lovett to reevaluate the policy of the United States towards Japan(2白)
This demonstrates clむailythe rolc、Kennanand his st立fwould play in the 
いreversecourse"， switchin耳from昌広eneralpeace and demilitarization to a 
separate peace and rearmament 
IV剛 TheSoviet Spectre: George F. Kennan and the Policy 
Planning Staf 
On August 9， 1947， in response to an inquiry from Secretary Mar“ 
おhall，Kennan evinced strong clis註tisfacionwith the Office of Far Eastern 
Affair's draft peace trcaty calling its contents regrcttable. Thereafter， via 
an initiative of the Policy Planning Staff， Kennan urgcd the rεworking of 
thc basic principles of the ]apanese peace and of ]apanesc policy. Havin日
gained the approval of Marshall and Lov巴t，from mid-August on， Kennan 
and his Policy Planning Staff devotecl thel1lselves to what woulcl be thc 
largest unclertaking since the Marshall Plan threc 1l0nths bcforc， 
This took about eight weeks during which Kcnnan was helpecl pri 
l1larily by John Patton Davics Jr.， anothcr Far Eastern spccialist who had 
relaxecl with Mao Tse-tung in Yenan as had El1l1l巳rsonand latcr， whilc 
serving in Moscow， had COl1le uncler the strong influ巴nceof Kennan. In six 
clrafts they rewrote the basic principles of policy on the ]apanese pease， In 
that process， Kennan took into account the opinions of the highly con 
servatlve“Japan crowd"， people Iike forl1ler Ambassador ]oseph Grew， the 
“spearheacl of the Hirohito clique"， his assistants ]，W. Ballantine anc! 
Eugene Dooman who assertecl the danger of the cOl1l1ltlIlists， and clrew 
also representatives of the army and navy into the cliscussion; outside the 
Department， Kennan contactεcl Navy Secretary Forrestall al1d Arl1lY 
Secretary Loyall， aclopting to a very great extent the opinions of thesc ~ 
l1len _L ノ、
During that time the Policy Planning Staff not only readclr巴ssedthe 四
problel1l of Japanese territories frol1l the point of view of strategy towarcl 五
the Soviet U nion， but also recol1ll1lended a change in Al1lerican security 
policy toward ]apan， favoring a revision ()f the“clel1locratization" po!icy 
then in force in Japan. lt was a recommendation for a change of policy in 
the broadest sense; from territorial issues to war crimes to the purge. For 
this reason it is clear that this recommendation was no merely a differ匂
ence between the cooperationist approach to the Soviet Union and the con. 
frontationist one， that is， a difference between foreign policy options. but 
also a difference rooted in political views that included domestic policies. 
The Policy Planning Staff grasped Japan's territorial dispute from the 
point of view of its anti.Soviet strategy basing it on the containment poli-
cy against commUl1sm. 
The Policy Planning Staff recommended that the phrase from the 
Potsdam Declaration “…minor islands as we determine..." in the vicinity of 
]apan be disposed of in accordance with the strategy of opposition to the 
Soviet Union. They realized that“minor islands" like the Southern 
Ryukyus and particulatly Okinawa would make effective strategic military 
bases against the Soviet Union， therefore those island， although properly 
]apanese territory， would have to be separated from ]apan and placed 
lInder the administration of the United States. This administration would 
preferably be in the form of direct rule. entailing only slight finacial bur. 
den for the United States， but inview of the trend of world opinion against 
such acquistions， a secondary or fallback policy would be to place the is巴
lands under United Nations strategic trusteeship with the United States as 
administrator. ln other words， the proposal was for such a separate peace 
without the Soviets that would utilize the Southern Kuriles and the 
Ryukyus as instruments to manipulate Japanese public opinion. 
Beginning with the Ryukyus， the United States would. in the first 
stage of peace treaty negotiations， cal for the divestiture from Japanese 
sovereignty of not only the Southern Ryukyus， which including Okinawa 
would be of important strategic value in confrontation with the Soviet Un-
_ ion， but also the Ryukyu islands north of the 29th parallel. Reasoning that 
六 ifthe Soviets would consent， inthe course of the negotiations. to restore 
:: the Southern Kuriles to Japan then -the American side would agree to re-
ム turnthe Northern Ryukyus. in this way the retrun of the Southern Kuriles 
ノ、
would be accompained by the result of neutralizing any Soviet policy of 
amity toward Japan. 
!!owcv打， if the Soviet Union would not agree to r('日toration(lf the 
Southern Kuriles， th巳UnitedStates would resist negotiations eoncerning 
the Northern RYllkyus， llsing them a日 alInstrllmellt to establish frielldly 
sentiment among the Japanese. In the final phase of negotiations， thc U.S町
would propose placing the Southern Ryukyus under U.N. strategic trustee-
ship alld that. in exchang(' for ]apanese assent to this proposal， the U.S 
would return the Northern Ryukyus， since they had only limited strategic 
value to the United States. By establishing this pretense of concession for 
the“restoration" ()f the Northern Ryukyus守 theAmerican side hoped to 
create “…the appearance of American amily..." in the minds of the ]apanese 
people(れ!)
A decision by the Soviet Union not to return the Southern Kuriles to 
]apan would be more desirable than if they elected to restore these same 
islands “if th日 SouthernKllriles b巴camean irredentist issue...there will 
then exist a cause for popular ]apanese resentment against the U.S.S.R. 
offsetting to a considerablc extent the effects of future Soviel propaganda 
in Japan，.." and have the reslllt of “.embarassing the Japan巴seCommunist 
Party in its efforts to serve Soviεt ends(:lO)" 
Moreover， itwas desirable as far as tactics against the Soviet Union 
were concerned， in the process of obtaining a separate peace， to stipulate 
that the Southern Kllriles belonged to Japan and then to force the Soviet 
Union to resist this claim. It would be undesirable to give the Japanese 
side the impr巴ssionthat what made Soviet participation impossible was a 
procedural formality. For example. the United States refused to agree with 
Soviet proposals on votin耳oron convening a Four Power Foreign Minis-
ters Conference. 1、hisinformatioll would provide the Japanese with an im 
pression of the llncooperative nature of the American side and would im-
plant the illusion that Japan might receive a more generous peace if the 
Soviet Union were involved and instill a false hope that the Soviets would 
。fferJapan more generous terms in a separate peace later. However， ifthe 六
Southern Kllriles were stipulated in the treaty to be ]apanese territory， 
and if the Soviet Unioll were not a party to the treaty. it would lead to the 七
conclusion that the Soviet llnion did not participate because it had no in 
tention of restoring th巴SouthernKuriles to Japan. In this way no bother. 
some illusions would be created about the Soviet Unioell) 
The Policy Planning Staffs proposal for a t巳rritorialsettlement inter 
fered with the proposals submitted by the State Department's Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs. Policy opposition arose in the contradiction between 
a separate peace and a general peace， between cooperationist policy and 
confrontationist policy， originating in differing assessments on tht' possi 
ble revival of Japanese militarism and the threat of Soviet communism. 
The Office of Far Eastern Affairs， fearing a revival of Japanese mili. 
tarism， urged the supervision of Japanese disarmament as a means of up. 
rooting militarism by either a Four Power administr品tion01'， in a weaker 
form， by the eleven nation Council of A mbassadors. The Policy Planning 
Staff though， fearing the threat of Soviet communism more than the reviv 
al of ]apanese militarism， preached the importance of defending Japan 
against the Soviet threat. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs lIrged the con. 
tinllation of the disarmament an【!demilitarization of Japan and wrote into 
the military c1auses of the draft peace the巴xculsiollof conditions which 
would ob日tructdemilitarization， but the Policy Planning Staff， even though 
allowing for supervlSlOl by the eleven.nation Council of Ambassadors. 
furthcr emphasized the need to defend Japan against the Soviet Union and 
commul1lsm. 
Th巴Sovietstrategy toward Japan was to utillize ]apanese communists 
to initiate the communization of politics in Japan. The Soviet Uniめo河川n
t syst佼ema以ticall片ypenet廿ra抗ting]apanεse society in thεf仏amiliarcommunis討tpa抗
t巴rn()f preparatれionfor r巴volt川us幻ionand s巴izureof pow巳r."For this purpose 
the Soviets were preparing “...approximately six hundred thousand 
Japanese prisoners of war..." in Siberia as“agents for expansion of 
Soviet influencc." ln r巳sponseto advancin宮 communizationwithin Japan， 
the Soviet Uuion would respond with military aggrcssion against her (:l2) 
Con日equently，in order to confront this “threat from the north"， the 
六 PolicyPlanning Staff sought the recommendation of a concrete proposal. 
First. thc Policy Plannin耳Staffadvocated the establishment of a con 
八、 stabulary，coast符uard，and a security force to deal with al in vasion from 
outside， meaning the SovIet Union. Concomitant with domestic unrest， 
these forces were in the future "..to bc susceptiblc to expansion and used 
in accordance with the decision of the American militaryC18) 
Secondly， in order to deal with domestic unrest or an invasion from 
without which could not be handled by the above-mentioncd Japanesc de-
fense forces， the Policy Planning Staff stipulated that the United States 
would offer military forces to Japan and that Japan would offer the United 
States military“facilities" to mak巴possiblethe use of these forces. The bi 
lateral agreement for military cooperation would have to b巴ratifiedby the 
two nations simultaneously with the signing of the peace treaty. 
The constabulary designated in this bilateral agreement. the proザ
totype of Ampo， eventually became the Police Reserve Force， the for日run-
ner of the SεIf-Defellse Force created in exchange for the San Frallcisco 
Peace Treaty 
V. Indiginous Forces and Exogenous Threat 
Th~ desparate proposals of the Policy Planning Staff and the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs on the relationship between the peac巴 treatyand the 
settlement of territorial issues did not originate simply on the foreign poli司
cy level， but could finally be traced back to the issue of the importance of 
indigenous political forces， particualarly domestic political reforms thell 
ullderway in Japan. 
The office of Far Eastern Affairs evaluated the independence of in. 
digenous political forces as follows: the native political forc巴s，gi vell the 
proper conditions， could function in their own iniernal logic. Therefore， 
for example，巴venif Japanese communism became strong. one need not fear 
that it would function as a fifth column of Soviet communism. What was 
nec巴ssarywas to carry out fully the“democratization of ]apan". The 
“democratization" would entail the increased political participation of the 
people both quantitatively and qualitatively and this illcreased participa 
tion， with the proper political education， would help to nurture political 六
forces free of narrow nationalism and sufficiently resistant to foreign in- 0 
f1uence 
These perc叩tionswere expressed， for example， by John K. Emmerson 九
in October 1946: 
if the U.S.S.I~. is succes日fuland the Japanese communist Party 
becomes a political force to b巴 reckonecl with， the military 
domination of Japan by the Soviet Union is yet a more difficlllt 
task.‘The long range obj日ctivesof American Policy in the Far 
East will be best served by vigorous and unswerving pllrsllit in 
}apan of the objectivcs alrcady set before lS. Our acts in Japan 
should not be conditioned by fcar of Communism so strong that 
we lean toward the very elements that we have set out to des 
troy. We shall aSSllre ourselves of a“favored position" in J apan 
if we succeed in effecting lastin耳reforms，in giving impetus to a 
genuine liberal movement， ancl in starting th巴processof clcmo. 
cratization in Japanese educatioe14) 
Borton agreed with these opinions holding that in view of the“anti-Soviet 
and anti-Communist feelings" innate to the Japanese， "..it was not neces-
sary to fear communist attack..."， and the日rgentthing， he emphasized 
tirelessly， was to facilitate the maturation of a democratic political struc-
ture within Japan(:l5). The fact that there was no change in his thinking 
about communism and democracy is clear from a memorandul1 he sent two 
years later， when the confrontation line based on the thinking of the Poli-
cy Planning St乱fhad begun to take effect， to the new head of the Office of 
Far Eastern Affairs， W. Blltterworth， under the l1ask of the opinion of the 
British Consul H.A. Grave(3ι) 
That men like Borton， El1merson， and Vincent valued the indigenous 
political forces and saw the completion of“democratization" as a neces-
sary condition for making ]apan a stat】ilizinginfluence in Asia can be 
seen already in the plans for postwar ]apan which they developed dllrin日
and after the war. For that reason they were able to give positive support 
to the variOlls reforl1s being advanced at that time by SCAP and in par 
ticular by the reformers of the Governl1ent Section， known as the“New 
Dealers". This was the broad program of“democratization"， which began 
with stripping the Emperor of his political role， the dissolution of the 
military and the Zaibatsu， land reform， and reaching even to the reforl1 of 
?????
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education and women's suffrage. 
However， the Policy Planning Staff did not give these domestic re 
forms their warm support. They were firm in their anti.communism， and 
they held a polar-centric view of power politics which saw the great pow司
ers as the center of international relations and werεtherefore lot able to 
appreciate fully the role of thゼindigenouspolitical forces. Hence they con 
sidered Japanese communists to be the Trojan Horse of the Soviet com-
munist party， and thought that the political threat of Soviet communism 
might easily transform itself， through the medium of the growth of com 
munist forces in Japan， into a Soviet military threat. In fact， as we have 
alrεady seen， as early as the spring of 1946， 1.1'. Davies had written the 
Department of State from Moscow， ringing the tocsill of the communist 
takeover of Japan following th巴withdrawlof Allied troops. 
While it is undoubtedly true that no evidence has come to hand 
‘showing direct connections between the Japanese Communist par 
ty and the LJ.S.S.R.， We must， in our own inter巴st.assume that 
such connections do exisL...If we withdraw from Japan without 
having assured ourselves of a favored position there， Japan may 
in a1l probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet LJ n-
(:)7) lOn 
For people like Daviεs， a disarmed Japan was as helpless as a babe in 
the woods掴 ThePolicy Planning Staff cndorscd the power-vacuum theory 
that John Forster Dulles would later develop， and preached the dallgers of 
??????
disarming Japan as followls: 
The fact that ]apan will be disarmed means that its territory wiU 
become a power vacuum when LJ.S. troops are withdrawn， unless 
some means is found to offset this(:38) 
For this very reason， they proposed on thεon巴hadthe establishment 
of constabulary， coast guard， and polic巴forces“…to be susceptible to ex. 
pansion and use in accordance with Ameriean military decision..." and 011 
the other hancl proposed the cstabiishrnent of American military bases in 
the vicinity of J呂panand， ifconditions permittccl， in ]apan itselL 
ドorth巴m]apan's political stability was to be found in a different 
climension than “democratization" “Democratization" benefitecl domestic 
radicals ancl in fact set political stability at risk， What was neecled wa日to
entrust Japanese politics to the proザAmericanfactions， which favored 
strong military， political， and economic ties with the Unitecl States to builcl 
a political structure under their leaclership ancl to transfonn Japan into 
an“Asian workshop" by reviving ]apanese capitalisnL 
ThllS， the Policy Planning Staff clenounced completely the postwar re-
forms propoちedprimarily by the Government Section ()f SCAP， favoring 
instead the rεlease of the Zaibatsu busines汚menwho had been purged， th巴
retrial of war criminals; they pointecl out the excesses of land reform and 
called f()r the establishment ()f a strong central police force ignoring the 
danger of a possibl巴 revivalof the secrεt police. Jt is inconceivable that 
olcl ]apan hands sllch a日GrewcOllld support icleas hke these. 
To b巴 Sllre，in the mind of the realist Kennan， the Soviet military 
thrcat and the commllnist politica! threat were clearly separate. Morcover， 
as in his policy toward Ellrope， so in his policy toward ]apan， Kennan 
warned against the folly of exaggerating the military threat of the Soviet 
Union. On this point， Kennan's theory O!1 thc Soviet threat was far more 
sophisticated than that of the military; it containecl the potential for con 
frontation with the thinking of the military， which placecl the military 
threat in the center of the pictrlle司 lnearly march 1948， having cleveloped 
the broad outlines of a ]apanese peace， Kennan went to Tokyo to learn the 
intention of SCAP ancl to survey the actllal conclitions in Japan_ ln Tokyo 
he met with MacArthur， the“Eastern Caesar" and came into contact with 
MacArthllr's thoughts on Japanese nelltralization. Therellpon Kennan real 
ized again the foolishness of exag宮eratingthe Soviet military threat. On 
五 March15， Kennan sent a telegr・amwhile vacationing in Manila to Secret-
F七~ ary Mar日hallwhich made clear the desirability of the nelltr且lizationof 
一 ]apael9) To be sure， he linked that neutralization with the idea of rnaking 
Okinawa into a permanent base， blt that was dlle to his sophisticated 
view of foreign policy. ThllS， on the spot there developecl a harmonization 
of the keen insight of the old Shogun， who while retaining Okinawa as a 
base did not exaggerate the military threat of the Soviet Union， and the 
pet theory of the young Russian expert， who grasped the Soviet threat as 
primarily political. 
Still， the approach of K巴nnan.who separated political and military 
threats and emphasized the former， exaggerated the political threat of 
cornmunisrn itself as much as did the military. and should he decide that 
the Soviet Union had crossed the threshold of risking war， he could easily 
assimilate the position of the military. Looking at the political unrest in 
Italy， Kennan recornmended in the telegrarn of March 15， 1948 from Man. 
ila to Secretary Marshall that“…the ltalian Cornmunist Party be out. 
lawed...";出isstance is tracable to the former emphasis(40). Until the fall 
of 1949， before he began the conflict with the military and the Hawks in 
the State Department， he had functioned as an informal diplornatic advisor 
for the military; this harmonization stems from the latter emphasis(41). 
Regardless， even while recognizing a subtle difference between poli. 
tical and military threat， Kennan argued for a change in policy toward 
Japan， recommending that Okinawa be rnade an American base and that 
the Southern Kuriles be used in a bargaining strategy against the Soviet 
Union， and while criticizing the ideas of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs， 
argued for the confrontationist option toward a separate peace and 
rearrnament. 
To the extent that bureaucratic rather than ideological factors were 
involved， the conditions at that tirne favored the side of Kennan and the 
Policy Planning Staff. In the internal reforrn of the State Department in 
September 1947， those favoring cooperation with the Soviet Union saw 
their influence weakened and those favoring confrontation rose to new 
prommence. 
Vincent， the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs， was reas- _ 
signed to the American Embassy in Switzerland， Borton was given a 五匂._
rneaningl巴sssinecure， and E恥r加I
rna抗tJohn All川is叩on，who succeeded Vinc閃en川l此t，was appOlll凶1此tedhead of the 一
]apanese divi隠siぬon，and Butterworth， a friend of Kennan since their Prince-
ton days， was appointed Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs， re-
sulting in the cornplete dissolution of the Borton group. Hilldring， a long 
standing supporter of Borton， was replaced by C.E. Saltzrnan， who had 
corne to the State Departrnent frorn Wall Street. As if synchronized with 
the personnel changes in Washington， George Atcheson， who had de. 
veloped into the rnost effective liason between SCAP and the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs， was killed August 17 in an airplane crash. He was re-
placed by Annapolis graduate Williarn Sebald who was well aquainted 
with the “good old days" of prewar ]apan. Finally certain ]apanese actions 
in Tokyo， reinforcing these personnel changes， contributed to the overall 
triurnph of the ideas of the Policy Planning Staff. 
VI.“The Message from the Emperor" 
In March when Borton traveled to ]apan， MacArthur rnade his deci-
sion clear， inline with the thinking in Washington， topush for an early 
peace. In response， the ]apanese Foreign Ministry estab!ished， under the 
supervision of the Foreign Minister， a Peace Treaty Liaison Board and an 
International Cornrnitee. The preparation of a draft peace distinct frorn the 
Arnerican draft took place under conditions of strict secrecy in the Coun-
cil of this cornrnittee. 
The broad outlines of the draft treaty which ernerged ran parallel to 
the intentions of SCAP and the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Although it 
rnade dernilitarization and security through the U.N. the basis of ]apan's 
post-peace security， there were subtle differences frorn both Washington 
and SCAP on the territorial issue. Basing itself on the prernise that 
]apanese territory should revert to ]apan， itincluded the following dis 
position of territories: the reversion to ]apan of al the Kuriles， ifthat 
proved irnpossible， the reversion to ]apan of the Southern Kuri!es (the is-
lands of Etorofu and south). The Northern Kuriles would be placed under 
U. N. trusteeship. The southern islands such as Okinawa and the Bonins 
should revert to ]apan or， ifal else fai!ed， be placed under U. N. trustee-
??????
ship. 
This draft peace drawn up by the Foreign Ministry received the sup-
port of the Katayarna Cabinet， Japan's first postwar Socialist-rnoderate 
??????
coalition government， and In particular the strong support of Forci宮n
Minister Ashida Hitoshi. It had been less than two years since the 
]apanese surrender， and for a defeated people wishing to recover their 
national pride. the recovery of the 103t territories constituted the most im 
portant objective. Moreover. the ]apanese economy had been in a pro. 
nounced clepression since earty spring of 1947 and the recovery of the 
103t territories appeared to offer the one hope of 3urmounting the econo 
mic difficulties of the post-peace years ドromthe dynamics of domestic 
politics it was only natllral，日iventhe poplllar movements for the recovery 
of the lost territori悶 whichbegan to f10urish at this tim巴.for th日Socialist
Party and particlIlarly Ashida， who aspired to be the next prime minister， 
to embrace the thinking of the Foreign Ministry(42) 
SCAP was irritated by ]apanεse actions centering around Ashida. 
Although it did not share the fear of a communist takeover within ]apan 
which was the belief held by the Policy Planning Staff. SCAP. basing its 
view on the realism gainecl from the bitter fighting in the Pacific， stil con 
sidered the minimun condition of clefending a clemilitarized ]apan to be the 
turning of Okinawa into a permanent base. This thinking matched precise-
Iy the thinkin氏。fthe military ancl the ]oint Chiefs of Staff， which had 
aclvancecl the Western Pacific clefense perimeter west as far as the of-
shore islancls of the Eurasian continent(43) 
Committecl to the demilitarizatIon of ]apan， SCAP worked to persuade 
the Japanese government to agree to the turning of Okinawa into a milit-
ary base， which meant the renunciation of Okinawa. Three factors made 
this persuasion effective. First. the mainstream within the postwar Fore 
ign Ministry consistecl of those who‘since prewar clays. hacl been pro-
Anglo-American. Seconcl， even though it containecl a pro-communist left 
wing， the Katayama Cabinet's main faction was a right wing Socialist 
group which did not hide its anti-communist colors ancl was formecl by a 
coalition with the nationalistic Democrats. Third. the precarious political 
system which followed th巴collapseof the olcl order allowed loose political 
耳rOllpingsformecl by the Imperial House， SCAP. ancl the耳overningpoωli此tic-
all官acl巴rsto function effectively(44 
Ashida rεcogniロzedthe political advantag，巴sof the movemεnt foωr 噂 the
recovery of the territories， but under preSSllre from SCAP and supported 
by his own anti-commnism ancl the ideas of the pro-Anglo-American fac-
tion， he gra【luallymovecl right， accepting Okinawa as in fact lost; then 
shifting on the iSSlle of ]apanese security from protection by U. N. secur 
ity guarantees to protection by American security guarantees which en-
tailecl a move from a general peacc to a separat日peace
On September 13， 1947， just about the time that a change in ]apan 
po!icy was being argued in the room of the I'olicy Planning Staff at Foggy 
Bottom， Washin耳ton，the turn to the right within the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry bore fruit. The fruit took the form of a message from Ashida via 
Sllzuki Tadakatsu， then Chief of the Central Liaison Office (Foreign Minis 
try)， to Lt. GCIl. Robert し Eichelberger，who had been in ]apan with 
MacArthur as the Commander of the Eighth Army and who would later 
become the right arm of Unclersecretalγof the Army Voorhees， a military 
staff officer assigned to promote a separate peace treaty. Ashida proposed 
that， insteacl of collecti.ve s日curitythrough the lJnitecl Nations， ]apan 
日honldhave its security guaranteecl instead by the lJnitcd States， by per-
mitting the U .S. to establish military bases on the islands in the vicinity of 
]apan( IS) 
It is not Iikely that this messa宮efrom Tokyo， transmittecl to the milit 
ary via Eichelberger， fully satisfied the military in Washington， for thc 
memorandum coulcl only be read in one way: that the establishment of a 
base in Okinawa presupposed that Okinawa itself was ]apanese territory 
and that a peace treaty hacl already been concluded. The military， though， 
had something more ambitious in mind: not simply borrowing bases in 
Okinawa but turning Okinawa itself into a permanent bas巴 and，beyond 
that， establishing bases in Japan proper. Moreover， the military hoped that 
the Unitecl States would occupY Japan for an extended period of tim巴，
一 hopefullyuntil the Soviet threat ceased to exist. 
五 In this sense， the message received one week later was much more to 
;:.: Washington's liking. This message came from Terasaki Hidenari， advisor 
:;: to the Emperor and formerly Counselor in Washington; it reachecl the 
ノ、
State Department via Atcheson's successor Sebalcl. 
By May 6 of that year， on his third interview with MacArthur， the 
Emperor， expr巴ssinghis concern over the difficulty of defending Japan fol. 
lowing the conclusion of a peace treaty， asked MacArthur directly， ...who 
will defend Japan following the withdrawl of the American Army(46)γ， ln 
the middle of September， Terasaki visited Sebald to convey the Emperor's 
thoughts on the future of Okinawa: 
Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United 
States will continue the military occupation of Okil1awa and 
other islands of the Ryukyus. ln the Emperor's opinion， such 
occupation would benefit the United States and also provide pro-
tection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a move would 
meet with widespread approval amOl1g the Japanese people who 
fear not only the menace of Russia， but after the Occtipation has 
ended， the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give 
rise to an“incident" which Russia could use as a basis for in 
terfering internally in Japan. 
The Emperor further feels that United 
occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be re-
quired) should be based upon the fiction of a long.t巴rmlease...25 
to 50 years or more...with sovereignty retained in Japan. Accord. 
ing to the Emperor， this method of occupation would convince the 
Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs 
of the Ryukyu lslands， and other nations， particularly Soviet 




Although retaining formal Japanese sovereignly， the long‘term lease of 
Okinawa to the U.S. as well as the long-term American occupation and 
militarization of Okinawa was the crux of the original framework of the 
Ampo system linking Okinawa to U.S.-Japanese anti-Soviet military coop-
eration. This was requested by Japan for the purpose of insuring Japanese 
security following the installation of the peace treaty. Terasaki provided 
his own opinion， distinct from that of the Emperor， regarding the relation‘ 
ship between U.S..Japanese military cooperation and the peace treaty. 
A日toprocedure. Mr. Tcrasaki felt that the acquisition of ‘'milit 
ary rights" (of Okinawa and other islands in the RyukYllS) should 
be by bilateral t1'eaty between the United States and ]apan 1'athe1' 
than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan. The lattεr 
method， according to Mr. Terasaki， would savor too mouch of乱
dictatcd peace and might in thc fllture cndanger the sympathetic 
understanding of the Japanese people(48). 
On September 20， Sebald transmitted this message in his memoran 
dum to General MacArthur and two days later forwarded its summary to 
Secretary of Statc Marshall with a copy of the memorandum 
札Thether“theEmperor's message" was produced under the Emperor's 
direction or that of his advisors， including Terasaki， cannot be determined 
until the ]apanese documents arc made public. it is important to note， 
however， that the Emperor's staff had an extraordinary fear of com叩
munization in postwar ]apan which was a continuation of the fear felt dur 
ing the war. 1n the occupation era， the Emperor's staft formed amorphous 
political groups of bureaucrats within the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. enlarging the circle to include SCAP officials and powerful mcn in 
government. These individuals continued to insist to SCAP the dangerous 
nature of the “threat" from the domestic communists and the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Union and Australia continued to demand that the Emperor be 
tried as a war criminal before the Military Tribunal of the Far East (1M-
TFE); thus the problem of trying the Emperor as a war criminal had not 
yet been resolved(49). 
This message from the emperor， however， issignificant because it 
greatly influenced the American policy makers' decisions on the disposal 
of the Ryukyus. The Emperor's message justified not only SCAP's position 
but also the Policy Planning Division's position， especially in the eye日 of
the Japanese. This justification had increased significance because it was 
made through the symbol of the Emperor. The Policy Planning Division's 
position envisioned the ful use of Okinawa as a permanemt bridgehead 
against alleged political infiltration and military invasion of Soviet Com-
??????
munism， urging strongly U.S.-Japanese military and economic cooperation 
through a separate peace treaty without the Soviet Union. The lease of 
Okinawa with the latent potential for Japanese sovereignty was a highly 
preferrable alternative to the strategic use of the island through a U.N. 
trusteeship for the top ranking officials of the U.S. Army and the State 
Department who were worried over the heavy expenditures required to 
govern Okinawa(50). 
Secretary of State Marshall transmitted this material immediately to 
George F. Kennan who wrote the special recommendation on Okinawa 
which was to be an addendum to the peace initiative toward Japan， emph・
asizing the significance of the message. 
The Policy Planning Staff accepted the principle of U.S. control 
over the Southern Ryukyus， noting that the Emperor of Japan has 
been represented as su臨estingthat the United States should 
continue military occupation of Okinawa and such other islands 
as may be required on the basis of a long.term lease， twenty five 
to fifty years or more， with sovereignty retained by Japan. The 
Staff feels that this formula might well be explored as an alterna. 
tive to strategic trusteeship(51). 
Early in March 1948， concurrent with Kennan's visit to Japan， the 
State Department received a message which requested the American's re. 
confirmation of the East Asian Defense perimeter “for defense against 
Soviet invasion and infiltration"， and asking them to redefine，“South 
Korea， Japan， the Ryukyus， the Philippines， and， ifpossible， Formosa as 




On the other hand， as we have already seen， Kennan set off for Tokyo 
and evinced a temporary sympathy for MacArthur's proposal that ]apan 
be demilitarized. But at the same time， Kennan met also with men like 
General Eichelberger and Undersecretary of the Army Draper， who hur-
ried to Tokyo from the crisis in Berlin. Kennan echoed their 
apprehensions over the inadequacies of Japan's domestic order and the 
threat of communism， and he arrived at a clearer sense of the military im-
plications ()f thc political threat ()f Sovi巴tcommunism a日 theyconcerned 
]apan， So， havin記 strengthenedhis confidence in the constabulary idea 
which was his pet theory and in the idea of turning Okinawa into a base， 
Kennan turnecl to the iclea that a peace tn、atyshoulcl not be concluclecl im-
mccliately， that it shoulcl be postponed ancl the Occupation arl1y remain in 
Japan at least l1ntil Japan had settled down cnough domestically so that it 
had the ability to resist communism， ancl that ]apanese defense forces 
ShOlllcl bc crぞatcd
Thrce weeks prior to Marshall's receiving the Emperor's messa郎、 ancl
shortly after Kennan'~古 staff initiated cliscussions on a ] apanese peace trea-
ty bascd 011 an u日ycildingpolicy of opposition to the Soviets， the Soviet 
Union announcecl， at the encl of Allgust 1947， its clecisive refual to the 
American sl1pported proposal on elections for the unification of Korea 
Thi日 rcfu日almark(、cla c1ear departure from the conciliatory pol icy foト
lowecl by the Soviets in response to the designation of the Southern Pacific 
Islands as a strate只icarea uncler the trusteeship ()f the United States， Fol-
lowing this change in policy， conditions in Korea worsened， leaclingεven-
tually to the outbreak of war less than three years later. 
Between the spring and fal of 1948， the recomm日ndationsof the 
Policy Planning Staff concerning policy towarcl ]apan gained the approval 
of th(、leadersof the military， the cxecutive branch， ancl thc State Depart-
ment. They became the internal consensus of the U.S， government， which 
came to fruitation in NSC Series 13， Subsequent policies on the t巴rritories
ancl on the peace proceed巴dalong thc lines debated ancl recommcncled up 
to this point 
In later・ yearsKennan， ironically enough， reminisced about the con-
nection between the turn to a separate peace with Japan， which he hil1self 
hacl been instrumental in bringing about， and the Korean War 
Official Washington appearecl， particularly at that til1e. imper-
vious to any understanding ()f the possible effect of its own acts 
and policies on Soviet behavior..I have 3een no cvidence that thc 
possibility of a connection between our decision to proceecl inde-
pendently to the conclusion of a separate ]apanese peacc settle 
?????
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ment， involving the indefinite retention of an Am巴ricanmilitary 
presenc巴inJapan in the post-treaty period， on the one hand， and 
the Soviet decision to unleash a civil war in Korea， on the other， 
ev巴rentered the mind of anyone in Washington except myself(;，:l). 
If the observation of Kennan as a historian are correct， we should 
take a new look at the hardening of U.S. policy and its selection of a sepa-
rate peace which caused the Soviet rejection of Korean elections in the 
summer of 1947. We should also take into consideration the American be-
havior and its function in the hardening of the Cold War in Asia. 
In September 1951， at the San Francisco Peace Conferencc， the Un 
ited States acquired Okinawa， with Japan formally retaining soverεignty 
and the continuance of military bases ther巴 wasapproved， as was sug-
gested in the “emperor's message"， and， to deal with the threat of Soviet 
communism， the Japan -U.S. Security Treaty was concluded. It was stipu-
lated that the Kuriles were to be， against the Policy Planning Board's re也
commendation， severed from Japan. It was added， however， that should 
Japan give the Soviet Union an advantage with respect to the Kuriles， it
must give the same advantage to the United States as well. This clause 
virtually prohibited bargaining with the Soviet Union over the Kuriles 
In the intervening thirty-two years Okinawa has been restored to 
Japan， but the military bases remain. The desposition of the northern ter-
ritories persists as an enigma with no solution in sight. Even in an era of 
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